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Ellenburg, Lt Col

N/J-3FD 3309 wpc

4 APR 1982

Flight 9 Turnover

1. This is to update you on why Flight 9 Turnover (from Space Division to ADCOM/SAC) has not been completed and propose we take that action now.
2. Flight 9 Turnover did not take place within the "normal timeperiod" ^{b1} because of the internal reflections problem with the IR sensor. Time was required for Space Division (SD) to develop and deliver a software fix, and the CGS to test and incorporate it into the operational software. Background information on Flight 9 acceptance for mission, Handback and what was done to correct the problem is at Atch 2.
3. The Space Division software fix has been delivered, tested and incorporated into the CGS operational program and provides positive management/control of the reflected data. Since this was the only open issue with Space Division regarding Flight 9, recommend we effect Turnover with the proposed message at Atch 1. HQ SAC/SX is ^{was started} starting a similar message to Space Division, effecting Flight 9 Turnover. (Atch 3)
4. Update on Flight 9: On ^{b1} at 1200 MST, Flight 9 began operation as the Pacific satellite. On ^{b1} it was at ^{b1} moving westerly toward ^{b1} degrees, and will be in final position o/a ^{b1} The software fix is working well while Flight 9 is moving and should do the same when it arrives at final location over the Pacific.
5. Regarding releasability to Canadian officials within the Command Section, the information contained in this staff summary sheet is releasable only to Lt General Thorneycroft, IAW the current DSP data disclosure letter. Regarding releasability to Canadian officials within J-2, J-5, and J-6, this information is releasable only to those officials identified by position in current DSP data disclosure letter.

RECOMMENDATION

6. Approve release of proposed J-3 message.

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2 Atch

1. Proposed J-3 Message
2. Background Info on Flt 9
3. HQ SAC/SX msg 08/1730Z (A) Apr 82

(Attachments 1 and 3 not available.)

Item 6(12)
1982

S/Col Thomas
Acty DCS / Apr

BACKGROUND INFORMATION

b1

Shortly after the launch of Flight 9, the internal reflection problem was discovered and some false data resulted b1 which was initially thought to be from this problem. Flight 9 was handed back to Space Division (SD) while the cause of the false data was sorted out. Cause was eventually determined to be improperly coded ground station software, which was soon corrected. During the period b1 the CGS developed and installed a temporary software fix to control the internal reflection data, so Flight 9 operations could be resumed. Flight 9 returned to operations on b1 Additionally, SD was tasked to deliver a refined software blanking fix which would control the reflected data while minimizing the loss of coverage from blanking. The CGS fix did control the data but at the expense of coverage in some areas, i.e., their fix was too broad in the amount of area blanked automatically.

Space Division (via IBM) delivered their software fix to the CGS in b1 and site installed the fix on b1 and not the best time to evaluate the fix. CGS recommended evaluation of the fix b1 Site has evaluated the fix from beginning b1 and reported to SAC and ADCOM that the software does the job -- the SD-delivered software is operationally acceptable.